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INTRODUCTION
Informal employment has traditionally been associated with inferior earnings, wage inequality and resulting poverty in the mainstream literature. The conventional segmented markets theory explains this stylized fact by postulating that labor informality is nothing but a survivalist alternative for those disadvantaged or rationed out of formal employment opportunities (Fields, 1975; Mazumdar, 1976; Bernabe, 2002; Perry et al., 2007) . Therefore, in a segmented labor market informal workers are typically subject to lower remuneration than similar workers in the formal sector, where wages are set above market clearing prices for institutional or efficiencywage reasons (Günther and Launov, 2006:2) . On the other hand, competitive labor markets theory argues that informal employment may equally well be voluntary based on private cost-benefit calculations of individuals and firms (Magnac, 1991; Pradhan and van Soest, 1995; Cohen and House, 1996; Marcoullier et al., 1997; Maloney, 1999; Saavedra and Chong, 1999; Gong and van Soest, 2002: quoting Henley et al., 2009:1) . In such a competitive market framework, formal/informal pay inequalities tend to disappear, especially when compensating differentials are accounted for. In contrast to these two polar views, a third view originated by Fields (1990) , posits a heterogeneous informal sector consisting of an upper-tier of those who are voluntarily informal; and a lower-tier of those who cannot afford to be unemployed but have no hope for a formal job (Cunningham and Maloney 2001; Fields 1990 Fields , 2005 Henley et al., 2009 ). In such a setting, the commonly accepted assumption is that the upper-tier often corresponds to selfemployment, whereas the lower-tier segment consists mostly of informal wage workers. In this study, we aim to discuss the relevance of these theories to the Turkish labor market.
There is an ample literature which purports to test the theory using estimation of formal/informal earnings gap. As put by Nguyen et al. (2011:2) : "Embedded in revealed preferences principle, and considering income as a proxy of individual utility, the approach assumes that if informal workers earn more than their formal counterparts (controlling for observed and unobserved characteristics), one could have good presumptions that they have deliberately chosen the informal sector". However, as with the theory, empirical evidence to date also seems to be mixed and inconclusive. Confirming the traditional segmented labor markets theory, most early studies find that formal sector workers are better rewarded for their earning-relevant characteristics than their informal sector counterparts (see Mazumdar, 1981; Heckman and Hotz, 1986; Roberts, 1989; Pradhan and Van Soest, 1995; Tansel, 1999 Tansel, , 2000 Gong and Van Soest, 2002) . In contrast, several recent studies report that wage differentials between formal and informal sector may not 3 be a stylized fact. For example, Pratap and Quintin (2006) find no difference between formal and informal earnings in Argentina after controlling semiparametrically for individual and employer characteristics. Also, Tannuri-Pianto and Pianto (2002) show that at high quantiles of the earnings distribution, differences in returns to skills completely disappears in the Brazilian labor market.
In this study, we aim to complement the existing literature by examining the earnings performance of formal and informal workers in Turkey. Turkey, given its demographic and economic dynamics, provides rich evidence for a large and heterogeneous informal labor market.
A comprehensive diagnosis of pay differentials, its underlying factors and detailed decompositions across individual and job characteristics are of great importance in such a developing country context. First and foremost, informal labor accounts for a substantial share of both urban and rural employment in most developing countries. 2 According to the Turkish Statistical Institute (TurkStat), the share of informal employment in the Turkish labor market stands high at 38.4 percent as of January 2012 (TurkStat, 2012) . Moreover, TurkStat reports that the rate of informality to be 82.8 for the agricultural employment and 25.8 percent for the nonagricultural employment. Evidently, an improved understanding of the formal/informal pay gap is crucial for addressing its welfare, equity and poverty consequences. Second, earnings gap is commonly used to test for the existence of segmented versus competitive labor markets. Large differentials are often viewed as an evidence for institutional rigidities in the labor markets, thereby suggesting need for policy action considering equity and efficiency purposes. Third, disentangling the dynamics of formal/informal pay gap across wage-versus self-employment workers and along various quantiles of the earnings distribution enables a multidimensional array of policy implications. In this fashion, one can also address the issue of heterogeneity within formal and informal sectors which is often an important issue in such earnings analyses.
Against this background, we aim to contribute to the literature by employing a rich panel data set and recently developed econometric methodologies to explore following research questions: (1) Is there a formal-informal employment earnings gap in Turkey? (2) Is there an informal sector earnings penalty that indicates the presence of segmentation in the Turkish labor market? (3) How does the earnings distribution across formal/informal sectors alter when employment is further broken down into wage-employment and self-employment, i.e. formal wage workers, formal selfemployed, informal wage workers, informal self-employed? (4) What are the main individual, 5 half of this penalty can be explained by observable variables. Moreover, the unexplained informal penalty for female workers is found as twice of that for the male workers when only individual characteristics are controlled, whereas when job variables are also introduced to the model, informal penalty for women appears at parity with that for male workers. Regarding formal/informal pay differences along wage/self-employment divide, formal-salaried workers are paid significantly higher than their informal counterparts. Moreover, confirming the heterogeneity within informal employment, we find that self-employed are subject to lower remuneration compared to those who are salaried. The quantile regression results show that pay differentials are not uniform along the earnings distribution, i.e. informal penalty decreases with the earnings level. A particularly important finding is that, in contrast to the mainstream literature which views informal self-employed as the upper-tier and wage earners as the lower-tier, lower-tier informal employment rather corresponds to self-employment in the Turkish labor market. Finally, fixed effects regression results show that unobserved individual fixed effects when combined with controls for observable individual and employment characteristics explain the pay differentials between formal and informal employment entirely. The implication is quite remarkable in the sense that formal/informal segmentation may not be a stylized fact of the Turkish labor market as previously thought.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief survey of empirical literature on earnings differentials in the formal/informal labor markets. Section 3 describes the data and definition of main variables used in the study along with a brief discussion of summary statistics. The econometric methodology and models are presented in Sections 4, and results are reported in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 provides a summary of the main findings and implications for policy. Carneiro and Henley (2001) consider the determinants of earnings and selection of workers into formal and informal employment, using the 1997 Brazilian household survey. In order to model selection, they adopt Lee (1978) 's three step procedure of simultaneous modeling of participation decision and earnings. Accordingly, they first estimate a reduced-form probit model of formal/informal sector participation choice and compute selectivity correction term which they later incorporate into the Mincer earning equation. In the last stage, they construct predicted earnings differentials using the earning function they estimated in stage two. The results imply 6 that age, tenure, education and gender are significant determinants of earnings. Furthermore, they report that the selectivity correction term is statistically significant in the earnings equation, hence quantitatively important in modeling earnings differentials. Gong and van Soest (2002) analyze the wage differentials between formal and informal sectors using quarterly panel data from Mexico. They use a dynamic random effects wage regression to explain the wage formation and differentials, thereby controlling for possible selection bias due to unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity which affects both wages and sector choice. The study is the first such to consider wages and sector choice to be simultaneously determined in one dynamic panel data setting. Using Heckman (1981)'s Monte Carlo simulated maximum likelihood methodology, Gong and van Soest find that age significantly affects formal sector wage, but not the informal sector wage; returns to education are positive in both sectors though much higher in the formal sector; lagged labor market state has no effect on wages and that random effects are insignificant in the wage determination process.
SURVEY OF LITERATURE
For the purpose of testing wage differentials across formal/informal divide in Argentina, Pratap and Quintin (2006) resort to propensity matching score matching (PSM) methodology to deal with the sample selection problem often inherent in such analyses. As with many other studies, they find a 25 percent formal wage premium using standard OLS estimation, controlling for individual and establishment characteristics. However, once they match observably similar workers using semi-parametric methods, Pratap and Quintin detect no evidence of a formal-sector wage premium; thereby reject the segmented formal/informal labor markets theory in Argentina.
In particular, they employ three different matching techniques: caliper, nearest neighbor and Epanechnikov kernel. In the last section, they evaluate robustness of their analysis considering the importance of controlling for firm size, unobserved worker characteristics which may affect both selection decision and wages and the value of other pecuniary and non-pecuniary benefits of a job. Badaoui et al. (2008) re-examine the informal sector wage penalty considering the non-selfemployed South African males. They emphasize the potential sample selection bias to be the main challenge in the context of measuring formal-informal sector wage gap. In this regard, their analysis is structured in a way that comprises several different estimations and comparison of their results. First, they run a simple ordinary least squares in levels on a standard Mincer wage equation, including only the informal sector dummy. The resulting 112 percent formal sector 7 wage premium falls substantially to 53 percent, once human capital variables (i.e. gender, race, marital status, education level, occupation, job training) are introduced to the estimation. Furthermore, Badaoui et al. report that the wage gap falls to 37 percent when job characteristics (i.e. firm size, industry, supervision, urban area, part-time status, and tools) are also controlled.
Following this line of research, they conclude that the observable human capital and job characteristics explain almost three quarters of average formal-informal sector wage differentials.
In order to account for any possible overestimation of formal-informal earning differentials resulting from income taxation, Badaoui et al. adjust gross earnings for taxation, and find that informal-sector penalty reduces by 48 percentage points when net earnings are considered. In order to purge for time-invariant factors that may affect both selection into informal sector and wages, Badaoui et al. take the first differences of the wage equation and estimate what is known as the difference-in difference (DID) statistics. The results depict a substantial decrease in estimated wage penalty, conveying that time-invariant unobservables are indeed an important factor affecting the wage differentials. Another important contribution of the paper is the implementation of propensity score matching (PSM) method, in which one first identifies the probability of selection into the informal sector, and matches individuals accordingly, thereby creating comparable groups. Combining the PSM method with DID, Badaoui et al. obtain similar results with that of DID estimation. Arias and Khamis (2008) apply the marginal treatment effect (MTE) methodology proposed by Heckman, Urzua, and Vytlacil (2006) to investigate the implications of labor market competitive and segmentation theories in the participation and earnings of formal-salaried, informal-salaried and self-employed workers in Argentina. The MTE method allows to account for the selection bias and sorting on the gain, thereby compare individuals indifferent at the margins of different choice and earnings. The empirical specification for participation/choice model is applied to three margins: formal-salaried work versus self-employment, informal-salaried work versus selfemployment and formal-versus informal-salaried work. Then, MTE estimations are ran for outcome/wage models in order to examine earnings differentials. The results provide evidence for both segmented and competitive informal labor markets views. For instance, formal-salaried and self-employment earnings do not exhibit any significant difference, once accounted for positive selection bias into formal-salaried work. Whereas, informal-salaried workers are found to bear significant earning penalties vis-a-vis their formal counterparts, even when controlled for the negative selection bias. 8 Alzúa (2008) investigates whether the Argentinian labor markets show any evidence of dualism, two different wage setting mechanisms and rationing in the access to primary sector jobs.
Considering the period 1975-2001, Alzúa estimates endogenous switching wage regression models with unknown regimes using Maximum Likelihood Search algorithms. The estimations comprise two wage equations (i.e., one for the primary and one for the secondary sectors) and a switching equation which measures the probability of being in the primary sector. One of the main contributions of the study is that the estimations are conducted without assuming ex-ante sector attachment. The results support the existence of two different wage-setting mechanisms with different returns to education and experience, thereby provide credence to the dual labor markets theory. Bargain and Kwenda (2009) examine the informal-formal wage gap in Brazil, Mexico and South Africa using large panels. The novelty of the study is twofold. First, usual measures of wage are adjusted for the taxes paid in the formal sector which are deemed to cause overestimation of the formal sector wage premium. Secondly, time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for by using fixed-effects quantile regression estimation proposed by Koenker (2004) and Canay (2011) . The sample is designed to include only urban male aged 15-65 who are not engaged in any form of education, working as unpaid family worker or public worker; and observed at least twice consecutively. Females are excluded from the sample given that most are engaged in unpaid family work and accounting for selection into labor market is not yet standard in quantile regressions. The results reveal a similar distributional pattern of informal wage penalty across all countries. Namely, informal wage gap prevails mostly in lower earnings quantiles and disappears at the top quantiles. Blunch (2011) contributes to the existing literature by examining the magnitude and determinants of formal-informal sector earnings gap in Serbia, specifically in the context of the recent International Financial Crisis. The empirical analysis is conducted and compared across four alternative measures of informality (firm registration, labor contract, benefit receipts and firm size) and two time periods of 2008 and 2009. In particular, Blunch first estimates the raw formalinformal sector earnings gap through Mincer wage regressions using ordinary least squares, then applies overall and detailed Blinder-Oaxaca decompositions to the observed earning gaps. The findings evince a large formal/informal sector earnings gap which somehow appears to decrease following the onset of the crisis. However, the gap does not exhibit a noticeable change when controlled for observable characteristics. The overall decomposition analysis displays that 9 controlling for observable characteristics and returns to these characteristics reduces the earnings gap, yet a substantial part of the gap still remains unexplained. Furthermore, a detailed decomposition analysis indicates that many of the observable characteristics indeed widen the formal/informal sector pay differences. Most notably, education and part-time status are significantly associated with the earnings gap across all alternative informality specifications and time periods. Falco et al. (2011) address the formal/informal employment earnings differentials using panel data from Ghana and Tanzania. First, they assume that movements in the labor market are exogenous and implement Abowd, Kramarz and Margolis (1999) framework on a standard Mincer wage equation, controlling for a set of time-varying observables including experience, firm size, sector and ability. Next, they extend the analysis by relaxing the exogenous movement assumption and allowing for possible endogeneity in sorting of workers across sectors. Following Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) , they exploit their panel nature of the data and use the lags of time-varying job-characteristics as instruments for the first differenced and the system GMM estimators. The results depict a highly significant firm size effect and a private and public sector earning gap. Whereas, the instrumental variable (IV) estimate reveals an even higher size effect relative to that of OLS, suggesting that OLS may actually be underestimating the sector and firm size effects, as opposed to what is commonly believed. Günther and Launov (2012) extend the existing literature by formulating a new econometric methodology which allows for a heterogeneous structure in the informal sector. The main purpose of their analysis is to test the segmented versus competitive formal/informal labor markets theory using cross-sectional data from Cote d'Ivoire. It follows that informal workers' earnings differ considerably according to their segment. Indeed, the results establish that informal sector is composed of two segments, one of which displays higher levels of earnings and returns to education and experience. Accounting for any possible bias of selection into employment, Günther and Launov conclude that dual structure of informal employment indeed explains why existing empirical evidence on testing of labor market segmentation are mixed, as they mostly assume a homogenous structure of informal sector employment.
The wage gap between formal and informal sectors in Turkey was first investigated by Tansel Firstly, they estimate a standard Mincer wage regression which incorporates a formality status dummy and control for the effects of observable individual characteristics on each sector's wage distribution. The results indicate that formal workers indeed earn significantly more than informal workers, even when controlled for observable characteristics. Baskaya and Hulagu further extend the analysis by estimating formal employment wage premium across different gender and age categories, where they find almost similar estimates across males/females and young/old. Then, they undertake a Propensity Score Matching (PSM) estimation which allows assessing the wage gap for workers with similar observable characteristics, thereby avoiding any potential bias of assuming formal and informal workers would have the same specification for their earning functions. The results also suggest significant wage gaps for all years under study.
DATA
The data set used in this analysis is drawn from the Income and Living Conditions Survey Subsuming a rich set of information on household expenditure, income and assets, employment and living conditions, SILC is invaluable for implementing a detailed earnings analysis for Turkey. First and foremost, the questionnaire allows us to distinguish between employed/nonemployed, salaried/self-employed, formal/informal divides. Along these lines, we identify four different labor market states: formal-salaried, informal-salaried, formal self-employed and informal self-employed. As regards to defining informality, the first internationally agreed operational definition was adopted in the 15th International Conference of Labor Statisticians in 1993. According to this definition, informal employment was defined as comprising "all jobs in informal sector enterprises, or all persons who, during a given reference period, were employed in at least one informal sector enterprise". Informal sector enterprises meaning enterprises that are "not constituted as separate legal entities independently of their owners, and for which no complete accounts are available that would permit a financial separation of the production activities of the enterprise from the other activities of its owner(s)" (Hussmanns, 2005:3) . Put differently, informality was ascribed to small-scale enterprises; enterprises operating without a legal status and/or employing unregistered workers; and family enterprises with unpaid family workers and the self-employed (Aydin et al., 2010:3). The definition was later extended to comprise self-employed in informal enterprises (i.e. workers, employer/owner of small firms, own-account workers, unpaid contributing family members); and wage employment in informal jobs (i.e. employees in informal enterprises, casual and domestics workers, industrial outworkers) (Chen, 2007) . A third definition, in official International Labor Organization (ILO) terms, considers an employment relationship as informal if it is not subject to labor legislation, social protection, taxes or employment benefits (Hussmanns, 2005:7) . The social security and contract status are by and large the two most common measurement criteria in applied research.
We adopt our definitions as consistent as possible to the existing theoretical and empirical literature. Individuals are classified into four mutually exclusive groups, formal-salaried, formal self-employed, informal-salaried and informal self-employed. In this regard, the SILC questionnaire explicitly asks individuals whether they are registered at the Social Security Institution for their main job. Accordingly, employees working for a wage/salary are defined as formal-salaried if they are registered at the Social Security Institution for their current job, and informal-salaried if they are not. Own-account workers form the self-employed category, which is further divided into formal self-employed if registered at the Social Security Institution and informal self-employed if not. We exclude unpaid family workers whose earnings are difficult to measure and employers for whom the number of observations is insufficient to perform any 13 reasonable analysis. By disaggregating the labor force into multiple subcategories, we are able to scrutinize the earnings gap across multiple dimensions.
As for the second important variable in our study, namely remuneration, SILC survey provides detailed information on individuals' annual income, months and hours worked on the main job.
We construct our dependent variable, log real hourly earnings, first by calculating the hourly earnings then deflating it by the 2006 Turkish Consumer Price Index (CPI). Another advantage of SILC questionnaire is that wage earners and self-employed are asked different questions regarding their annual income, therefore measurement error in our analysis can be assumed as negligible. The reported earnings are net of taxes, thus we do not have to account for any overestimation that may stem from formal sector earnings being subject to tax deduction.
Besides formality status and earnings, the SILC data set also includes rich information on other variables that are associated with the level of earnings. In this study, we group these variables into three categories as individual, household and job characteristics for presentational brevity.
Accordingly, individual characteristics consist of gender, age, education; household characteristics include household size, marital status, whether the household have children, household head status, whether there is a formal worker in the household; and finally job characteristics comprise sector of economic activity, occupation, firm size and part/full-time status. A comprehensive list of variables used in the analysis and their definitions are provided in Appendix Table A1 . Table 1 presents some fundamental summary statistics of the main variables used in the analysis.
The statistics are reported separately for the subsamples of formal and informal employment broken down into wage/self-employment. At first sight, the results clearly reveal a sizable earnings differential between the formal and informal employment, where earnings of formal workers are almost three times that of informal workers'. However, when the earnings gap is decomposed into wage/self-employment we observe that wage employees earn more on average than the self-employed. In other words, among each group of formal and informal employment, wage earners are better off compared to the self-employed workers.
The gender variable indicates that male workers dominate employment in any type. Indeed, females constitute only one fifth of each group of employment, except for the informal wage work category where they are even more marginal at only four percent. In terms of age, we see 14 that formal workers tend to be younger on average than informal workers. Also notable, formal self-employed workers appear mostly in the younger age groups, whereas informal self-employed workers tend to concentrate in the older age groups.
Education, confirming the conventional wisdom, exhibits a positive (negative) relationship with formal (informal) employment. On average, formal workers are better educated than informal workers; especially those in wage employment. More specifically, almost 50 percent of those who are formally employed have a high school or above degree, whereas for informal employees corresponding number remains at only 13 percent. Considering the wage/self-employment divide, the self-employed tend to have significantly lower levels of education compared to wage workers.
As for experience, the results reveal that informal workers have on average more years of experience in the labor market, especially those who are informal self-employed.
In terms of the household characteristics, the summary statistics demonstrate that employment in all types are dominated by those who are married and have children. Being head of the household displays a stronger association with being an informal worker, whether wage or self-employed.
Household size does not show any differentiable pattern across formal/informal or wage/selfemployment jobs.
Proceeding with employment characteristics, an initial look at the sector summary statistics displays two notable patterns. First, agricultural employment mostly prevails as informal selfemployment and second, manufacturing is predominantly a formal sector. Except for these two large sectors of, distribution of formality is quite dispersed for the other sectors. Specifically, informal employment appears larger in construction and trade, whereas formal workers are often concentrated in energy, public administration and education. Across the wage/self-employment divide, a few points are worth to mention. Formal employment in construction and agriculture sectors, though minimal when compared to informal employment are typically in the form of selfemployment. The distribution of formality across different occupations does not indicate any noticeable pattern. We also observe that informal employment is concentrated mostly in small firms; as compared to formal employment which is predominantly present in large firms. Finally, part-time job holders are more likely to be informal, particularly if informal self-employed.
The summary statistics, overall, indicate that formality/informality of jobs is associated with several observed and unobserved characteristics and is unlikely to be randomly assigned across 15 different employment types. From an empirical standpoint, this fact constitutes the main challenge in estimating the existence of an earnings gap between the two sectors. In order to deal with such a potential sample selection bias, as it is called, we exploit the panel nature of our data to account for time-invariant unobservable effects and several individual and job characteristics as explanatory variables to control for the observable effects.
The analysis is based on the seminal human capital earnings model of Mincer (1974) , which can be traced back to the human capital theory of Becker (1962 Becker ( , 1964 , Schultz (1960 Schultz ( , 1961 and Mincer (1958 Mincer ( , 1962 . The model postulates that three main determinants of individual wages are education, work experience and its square. As with most studies, we extend the model by including a number of variables which are frequently used in the empirical literature to explain returns to human capital characteristics and earnings of individuals. In order to estimate the formal/informal earnings gap, we specify the following Mincer earning models:
( will be used to test whether there exists a wage penalty/premium for informal employment visa-vis formal employment.
In the same manner, we will extend the analysis into wage/self-employment divide, in order to account for the heterogeneity inherent within the formal and informal sectors. As defined in the previous section, we consider four employment types as formal-salaried, informal-salaried, formal self-employed and informal self-employed. Accordingly, we create four dummy variables indicating each employment type, specifically for the formal-salaried; for the informalsalaried; for the formal self-employed and for the informal self-employed. For this empirical specification, we take the reverse approach and identify the informal-salaried as the base category. Along these lines, the extended model can be formulated as:
( 2) The estimated coefficients , and are interpreted as the conditional earnings gap between the informal-salaried workers and formal-salaried, formal self-employed and informal self-employed workers, respectively.
First, standard earnings equations are estimated at the mean using OLS in levels on a pooled sample of workers over years. For this particular estimation, we specify the following wage equations:
(3)
We will start by estimating equations (3) and (4) using only the employment type dummies (i.e. formal or informal) and year dummies. A year dummy is intended to capture all effects that are common at a given point in time. However, as displayed in the summary statistics, formality of jobs is related to several observable individual and job characteristics. Following this manner, we will proceed our estimation by first including individual and household characteristics, then further extending it by introducing job characteristics. In this way, we aim to understand the extent to which observable characteristics explain the average earnings differentials across formal/informal employment. Moreover, we conduct the analysis not only for the whole sample, but also for male only and female only samples in order to take into account of gender dynamics that often impede empirical analysis.
Considering the fact that estimations at the mean tend to conceal important information, we will rely on quantile regressions (Koenker and Bassett, 1978) to estimate earnings gap on our pooled sample. Quantile estimation, as put by Nguyen et al. (2011:12) , enables analyzing the earnings gap at different points of the earnings distribution. In this way, we aim to capture the heterogeneity in returns to observed characteristics along the conditional quantiles of the earnings distribution. We implement the following QR models which specify the th conditional quantile of the log real hourly wage ( ) distribution for individual i at time t as: ,
18 (6) where the set of coefficients demonstrate the estimated returns to the covariates at the th quantile of the log real hourly wage distribution. In particular, in both QR specifications depicts the effects of changes in the set of individual and job characteristics on the th quantile of . In model (5), measures the extent to which informal employment wage penalty/premium vis-à-vis formal employment wage remains unexplained at the various quantiles after controlling for individual and employment characteristics. Whereas, in model (6), , and refer to the earnings differentials at the th quantile between informal-salaried workers and formal-salaried, formal self-employed and informal self-employed workers, respectively. The quantile regression coefficients in model (5) are straightforward to estimate by minimizing:
Similarly, coefficients for model (6) can be estimated following the same fashion.
Having controlled for several observable characteristics by using OLS and quantile regressions, we next exploit the panel nature of our data set and estimate Fixed Effects OLS regressions. In this way, we are able to account for the time-invariant unobservable factors that may be obscuring more accurate measures of the earning differentials. The FE models can simply be written as:
where for all individuals i and periods t. In this panel specification, denotes the time-invariant unobserved individual fixed effects and is normally i.i.d. stochastic term absorbing the measurement error. In model (7), the estimated coefficient measures the conditional informal employment earnings premium/penalty vis-à-vis formal employment. As follows, coefficient estimates in the model (8) 
with (13) Equation (9) illustrates the changes in the earnings of stayers; equations (10) and (11) Before proceeding to estimation results, a few empirical points should be addressed. First and foremost, the issue of selection into employment is often accepted to be crucially important in such analysis. Indeed, as Tansel and Kan (2012:12) report a substantial majority of the working age population in Turkey is classified as out of labor force. In order to alleviate potential sample selection bias, we restrict our sample to employed individuals as done in several other studies.
Also taking account of the intrinsic differentials in male and female labor force participation 4 For presentational brevity, the results of the transition analysis are not reported but available upon request. 20 rates, we run our estimations separately for male and female subsamples. And most importantly, we assume that the panel nature of our data which allows controlling for time-invariant unobservables affecting earnings also controls for selection. Finally, we define our dependent variable as the log hourly earnings, i.e. hourly wage rates for the wage workers and their equivalent for the self-employed. The SILC questionnaire allows us to identify the earnings of wage and self-employed workers accurately as it employs specific earnings questions for each type of employment.
RESULTS

Pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS)
Earnings Gap Across Formal/Informal Employment
We start by estimating the formal/informal employment earnings gap using OLS in levels. First,
we begin with a model which includes only the informal worker dummy and year dummies. The results, reported in the first column of Table 1 , indicate a significant wage penalty for informal employment amounting to 53.9 percent. However, as we have mentioned previously, differences in earnings can be attributed to several observable and unobservable factors. Following this line of thought, we first introduce a number of individual and household characteristics into our earnings model, and re-estimate the earnings gap. The results, given in the second column of Table 1 , show that informal earnings penalty indeed falls considerably to 31.8 percent. Put differently, almost half of the earnings differences between formal and informal employment can be explained by the observable individual and household characteristics. Further extending the model by incorporating the job aspects, we again detect a significant but lower informal earnings penalty of 21.5 percent. As Badaoui et al. (2008:695) remark one may argue that some of these job characteristics are almost exclusively concurrent with informal sector, still the results of this exercise provides an important initial insight into the earnings differentials. In brief, OLS analysis confirms the existence of an informal sector earning penalty, but also show that more than half of this pay difference is indeed explainable by observable factors.
A gender breakdown of formal/informal earnings analysis is of crucial importance for several reasons, particularly in the context of Turkish labor market. First, the incidence of inactive women still stands as a major virtue of the Turkish labor market; thence distorts most aggregate labor market figures. As regards to informality, Tansel and Kan (2011:6) report that almost two 21 thirds of those women who are employed are informal, while men exhibit a more or less equal distribution across informal and formal sectors. They also find that men are mostly employed in salaried positions and women in self-employment positions. In our analysis, we alleviate the empirical implications related to gender to some extent by excluding from the sample those in agricultural and unpaid family work where most female employment is present. Nevertheless, we believe that a gender breakdown still deserves an interest though without going into much detail.
When we re-estimate the OLS in levels separately for male and female subsamples, we see that female workers suffer a substantially higher level of informal earnings penalty. More specifically, we find that the raw earnings penalty stands at -0.707 for female subsample, whereas it is quite lower at -0.505 for the male sample. When controlled for individual and household characteristics, despite decreases in magnitude, there still remains a considerable unexplained informal pay penalty of 25 and 45 percent for males and female workers, respectively. Put differently, women still appear to experience a wage penalty almost twice of those born by male workers. This finding suggests that returns to personal attributes constitute an important determinant of male workers' earning differentials, whereas for female workers they are less significant. This results may be interpreted as a reflection of discrimination against women.
However, once all observable characteristics are introduced into the model, the negative informal premium for females also falls substantially, and becomes almost equal to that for male workers.
This finding may be a reflection of the fact that women are mostly employed in jobs which are intrinsically informal in its nature.
Earnings Gap Across Formal-salaried/Informal-salaried/Formal self-employed/
Informal self-employed
A further breakdown of the formal/informal earnings gap including wage/self-employment divide is expected to disseminate a more detailed portray given that both of these sectors embody sizable heterogeneity. For this analysis, however, we choose to identify informal-salaried workers as the base category and interpret the estimation results accordingly. Nevertheless, the implications of the results do not change.
Considering the raw earnings differentials, estimation results in the first three columns of Table 2 appear to confirm the traditional theory that informal-salaried workers on average earn significantly less than those who are formally employed, whether salaried or self-employed. In particular, wage workers who are formally employed earn approximately 50 percent higher than 22 those who are informally employed. Once controlled for personal attributes, as reported in column two of Table 2 , formal premium decreases to around 30 percent, but still remains to be significant. With the introduction of job characteristics, formal/informal wage differentials exhibit a notable fall and becomes 18 percent. Overall, the results suggest that there indeed exists a positive pay premium for formal wage workers compared to their informal counterparts. This evidence appears to be in line with the conventional wisdom that informal wage employment is on average subject to lower remuneration.
An interesting result can be observed when earnings differences of informal-salaried and formal self-employed are considered. In particular, the size of earnings gap, which is around 30 percent, appears to remain robust against the inclusion of additional explanatory variables. Put differently, personal and job characteristics explain the pay differences to only a minimal extent. This finding is mostly likely the result of informal-salaried and formal self-employed jobs and workers being utterly different in nature, thereby rendering the earnings gap unexplained.
Also noteworthy is the comparison of the earnings gap between different types of informal employment. As per se, informal self-employed are observed to be significantly worse-off than informal-salaried workers but only when individual and job characteristics are introduced to the Mincer equation. Indeed, the initial raw estimate though having a negative is not significant, but becomes significant as observables are taken into account. To this end, one can claim that informal-salaried workers on average have better observable characteristics than their selfemployed counterparts, and once returns to these attributes are considered they are infact significantly lower paid.
We next replicated our analysis separately for the male and female subsamples. We find that the picture somewhat alters but the changes are mostly limited to earning differentials within informal employment itself. In particular, pay gap between informal-salaried and informal selfemployed is almost insignificant for male workers. Whereas for the female subsample, the coefficient of informal self-employment is highly significant under all specifications of the model. In particular, informal self-employed female workers are paid around 40 percent less than their salaried counterparts. It is also interesting to note that the earnings penalty increases sharply to 70 percent if we control for individual and household effects. This finding implies that monetary returns to similar personal attributes are considerably lower in informal selfemployment compared to informal wage employment. The penalty falls back to 40 percent when 23 job attributes are also incorporated into the model. Overall, these results indicate that females are more prone to hold lower-tier informal jobs which have inferior earnings in contrast to males clustering at higher-tier informal jobs where pay differentials between wage and self-employment are insignificant.
Pooled Quantile Regression (QR)
Earnings Gap Across Formal/Informal Employment
Estimations at the mean are generally insufficient when covariates affect not only the location of the conditional distribution of wages, but also its dispersion. Therefore, one has to go beyond a simple mean estimation model and apply quantile regression for a more comprehensive and informative analysis. Therefore we extend our empirical analysis by estimating conditional quantile regression (QR), as given in equations (5) and (6), on our pooled sample. This exercise allows for tracking the earnings gap along various conditional quantiles of the earnings distribution, thereby unveil more complex dynamics pertained to pay differentials.
The quantile regression estimates, reported in Table 3a , depict that informal employment earnings penalty is larger at lower quantiles but decreases significantly in higher quantiles, even after several observable individual and job characteristics are controlled for. In particular, the coefficient of informal variable which is -0.593 in the 5 th quantile gradually falls as we move along the earnings distribution and eventually emerges as insignificant around 90 th quantile.
More interestingly, the informal earnings gap becomes significantly positive at the top quantile.
The large earnings penalty in the lower quantiles may be thought of as affirming the traditional segmentation theory which views informal employment as an inferior state. However, confirming our basic premise of a heterogeneous informal sector, the earnings gap is infact not uniform along the distribution and turns into a premium at the top. The last finding reveals that upper-tier informal jobs which are voluntarily chosen by workers given their preferences, personal attributes and competing earning prospects are concentrated in the upper income levels. In order to further scrutinize the underlying dynamics of these findings, we will re-estimate the gap considering not only formal/informal but also wage/self-employment divide in the following section.
The results of the gender decomposition of the QR are qualitatively similar to the analysis of the entire sample and changes are quantitatively small. More specifically, both female and male informal workers are found to experience significant earnings penalties at the lower quantiles of 24 the earnings distribution. The magnitude of the informal penalty is only marginally higher for female workers. One may also note that formal/informal earnings differences becomes insignificant for female workers at the 75 th quantile and displays a significantly positive sign at the top quantile. Whereas for male workers, the informal wage penalty disappears at the 90th quantile and is statistically insignificant afterwards. This is a particularly interesting result since it shows that upper-tier informal jobs are considerably more rewarding for female workers. The informal premium for female workers at the top which reaches almost 35 percent may also be an indication of positive discrimination towards women against men given similar observable personal and job characteristics.
Earnings Gap Across Formal-salaried/Informal-salaried/Formal self-employed/
Informal self-employed
A further breakdown of the formal/informal earnings gap by incorporating wage/self-employment divide empowers a more thorough examination. Several theoretical and empirical studies address the issue of intrinsic heterogeneity within the formal and informal sectors, and suggest that more accurate and informative analysis requires it to be acknowledged. In this section, we report and discuss the conditional QR estimation results of the Mincer wage function where informalsalaried workers are taken as the reference category. The first row in Table 4a confirms the conventional wisdom that within salaried employment, formal workers have significantly higher earnings than their informal counterparts, given identical personal and establishment characteristics. However, this formal sector premium for salary workers decreases gradually with the earnings level, and eventually becomes negative at the top. The results point to the dual nature of informal sector, with upper-tier jobs carrying an earnings premium that may compensate the benefits of formal wage work and lower-tier jobs being largely penalized. One may also claim that formal-salaried workers have better unobservable skills compared to their informal counterparts considering the fact that results are obtained by controlling for only observable characteristics. To further investigate this, we will next apply the fixed effects estimation to earnings gap which allows for controlling for unobservable heterogeneity.
Turning to earnings differentials between formal self-employed and informal-salaried workers, as reported in the second row of Table 4a , we detect a significantly positive gap at all quantiles. Put differently, formal self-employed are better-off along the whole distribution, though the size of their earnings premium falls with increased income levels. This finding may be the result of either better unobserved skills of formal self-employed workers or pure intrinsic premium in the formal 25 self-employment.
A comparison which deserves particular interest the pay gap is between informal salary vis-a-vis self-employed workers. The QR estimates in the third row of Table 4a demonstrate that informal self-employed suffer a significant earnings penalty but only at the lower end of the distribution of the 5 th , 10 th and 25 th quantiles. Afterwards, the gap becomes insignificant for the upper half.
Overall, the evidence clearly demonstrates the heterogeneity within informal sector; where the lower end corresponds to segmented and upper quantiles to competitive labor markets theories. In The distributional pattern of earnings gap becomes even more discernible when the analysis is limited to female subsample. The first thing to notice in Table 4c is that the formal wage premium at the lower half of the earnings distribution completely vanishes at the upper half. This result provides evidence for the presence of labor market segmentation at the lower end, but also shows that this may not apply to workers at the top. Indeed, the results show that the 48 percent formal-26 salaried wage premium at the lowest quantile turns into a 42 percent penalty at the top.
Comparing with the corresponding figure for male workers which is only 8 percent, this result is particularly intriguing. One can argue that this may be solely due to better unobserved skills of informal-salaried individuals at the 95th quantile which are rewarded with higher pay. However, such a result is often taken to be an evidence of heterogeneity in the informal sector, lower-tier being subject to worse pay conditions in contrast to upper-tier having better remuneration.
Turning to the earnings gap between formal self-employed and informal-salaried female workers, we do not observe any pronounced pattern as was found in the male subsample. This is most likely due to female formal self-employment being almost negligible in the Turkish labor market.
Last but not least, we observe that informal self-employed female workers are consistently worseoff than their salaried counterparts throughout the earnings distribution. In contrast to the results for all and male samples, the coefficient of informal self-employment does not become positive at the top quantiles. This finding is also of particular importance as it clearly demonstrates that informal self-employment constitutes the lower end for female workers, where remuneration is always worse than salary work.
Fixed Effects
Earnings Gap Across Formal/Informal Employment
Time-invariant unobserved individual heterogeneity is accepted to play an important role in explaining the formal/informal earnings gaps, even after controlling for a rich set of observable individual-and job-level characteristics. El Badaoui et al. (2008:697) claim that there are often several unobservable factors which determine both selection desicion into the formal/informal employment and wages, thereby if not taken into account will lead to biased estimates of the earning gaps. Similarly, Abowd et al. (1999) report that are by far the most important factor in determining earnings. Following this line of thinking, we exploit the panel nature of our data and rely on fixed effects estimation to purge such unobservables, thereby isolate their effect on pay differences. The estimation results for the two model specifications, equations (7) and (8) 
Earnings Gap Across Formal-salaried/Informal-salaried/Formal self-employed/
Informal self-employed
When replicated for the second Mincer specification, equation (8), results are qualitatively similar to previous findings. Specifically, the fixed effects estimation displays that there is no statistically significant earnings gap between formal-and informal-salaried workers. Whereas, for male wage earners, we find a 10 percent formal premium. Though not statistically significant, the coefficient of formal-salaried emerges as negative for female wage workers, implying a formal penalty.
Formal self-employed workers appear to be significantly better-off than informal-salaried, even after controlling for individual fixed effects. However, further breakdown of the sample show that this finding loses relevance when sample is restricted to females only.
As for within informal employment earnings differentials, we find no statistically significant gap once we control for unobservable factors using fixed effects regression. Again for the females, however, it is statistically significantly negative, implying the existence of an earning penalty for the informal self-employed when compared to their salaried counterparts.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this study, we examine the formal/informal sector earnings differentials in the Turkish labor market in terms of its prevalence, magnitude and underlying dynamics. For this purpose, we First, we estimate standard Mincer earnings equations at the mean using OLS on a pooled sample of workers. Across formal/informal divide, the results indicate a significant raw penalty for informal workers, which tends to decrease as other earning-related variables (i.e. individual, household and job attributes) are included in the regression. Overall, the analysis confirms the existence of an informal penalty, but also shows that almost half of this penalty can be explained by observable variables. We also find that the unexplained informal penalty for female workers is twice of that for the male workers when only individual characteristics are controlled for demonstrates that returns to personal attributes are comparatively lower for female workers, hence implying the presence of discrimination against women. However, once job variables are also introduced to the model, informal penalty for female workers is at parity with that for male workers. Turning to formal/informal pay differences along wage/self-employment divide, our results are in line with the traditional theory that formal-salaried workers are paid significantly higher than their informal counterparts. Confirming the heterogeneity within informal employment, we find that self-employed are often subject to lower remuneration compared to those who are salaried.
Acknowledging the fact that earnings at the mean are not so informative, we next estimated quantile regressions on our pooled sample. Indeed, the results show that pay differentials are not uniform along the earnings distribution. More specifically, we find that informal penalty decreases with the earnings level, i.e., it is significant at the lower quantiles but either becomes insignificant or even turns into a premium at the top. The results, overall, confirm our basic premise of a heterogeneous informal sector upper-tier jobs carrying a significant premium that may compensate the benefits of formal wage work and lower-tier jobs being largely penalized. 
